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POST CONVICTION PROCEDURE
Cheney C. Joseph, Jr. *
PRESENTENCE INVESTIGATION
Louisiana law leaves the question of obtaining a presentence report
solely within the discretion of the trial court.' The writer knows of no
case in which an appellate court has found an abuse of discretion from
the trial court's failure to request a presentence investigation. Never-
theless, in State v. Lockwood,2 in an opinion by Chief Justice Dixon,
the Louisiana Supreme Court established the principle that a presentence
report, if ordered by a trial judge, must be "a fair and accurate report."
In Lockwood, the defendant pled guilty of two counts of aggravated
crime against nature with pre-teenage boys. At the first sentencing pro-
ceeding the trial court refused to afford defense counsel an opportunity
to refute or explain "materially false or invalid information" in the
report, and sentenced the defendant to serve two years imprisonment
at hard labor. The Supreme Court remanded the case with instructions
to permit the defendant to examine the allegedly erroneous information.
At the hearing on remand, the defendant asked for a "supplemental
presentence investigation." This was denied and the court reimposed the
two year sentence.
On the second appeal in Lockwood the supreme court held that a
defendant is not merely entitled to "refute" or "explain" allegedly false
information in the report but rather is entitled to have false information
eliminated from the presentence data upon which the sentencing court
will .rely.' It was not sufficient for the judge merely to allow the
defendant to attempt to disprove the assertions in the report. In fash-
ioning a remedy, the court remanded the case with instructions that an
entirely new presentence investigation be conducted (and a new report
prepared) and that the defendant be sentenced by a different judge who
was not "exposed to the existing inaccurate and prejudicial report."
Copyright 1985, by LoUIsIANA LAw REviEw.
* Professor of Law, Louisiana State University.
1. La. Code Crim. P. art. 875 (A)(1). Compare Fed. R. Crim. P. 32(c)(1).
2. 439 So. 2d 394 (La. 1983).
3. The opinion reveals that the probation officer did an unacceptable job, relying
on the notes of interviews by another officer who initiated the investigation and law
enforcement reports. The officer failed to interview the defendant, the victims, or the
victims' parents. Furthermore, the State did not endeavor to substantiate any of the
contested material.
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The writer applauds the court's approach as very sound from both
practical and theoretical standpoints. The purpose of the presentence
report is to provide from an impartial source (the probation officer)
information for the trial court to use in sentencing. In view of the
supposed "neutrality" of the investigator, there is good reason to believe
that the sentencing judge will rely heavily on the factual assertions and
factual conclusions in the report.
The Louisiana Supreme Court had earlier made a great stride in
the series of cases in which the court recognized a defendant's right
(although qualified) to be made aware of and to rebut contested factual
assertions. 4 However, the importance of Lockwood is the court's rec-
ognition that, in cases of "significantly and substantially inaccurate"
reports, the prejudice may be impossible to erase without requiring a
new presentence report and remand for sentencing before a different
judge.
Although the opinion appears to be predicated on constitutional
grounds, the court does not explicitly outline the basis for its decision.
Whether or not the "due process" clauses of the United States or the
Louisiana constitutions require such a result, the Louisiana Supreme
Court may properly exercise its supervisory jurisdiction to insure that
trial judges make sentencing decisions based on accurate data. The
court's direction to the lower courts and probation officials in Lockwood
will doubtedly help to further that goal.
RESTITUTION AS A CONDITION OF PROBATION
The subjects of "victim's rights" and "victim's compensation" have
certainly become important topics for criminal justice policy makers.
Restitution to the victim is an appropriate, and specifically enumerated
condition of probation in Louisiana. Article 895(A)(7) of the Louisiana
Code of Criminal Procedure authorizes the sentencing judge to require
a defendant to pay "reparation or restitution to the aggrieved party for
damage or loss caused by his offense." Article 895.1 was amended by
Acts 1984, No. 940 to require the sentencing judge to order restitution
as a condition of probation for "actual pecuniary loss" if the offense
involved "monetary loss or medical expense" to the victim or his family.
To what extent does the discretionary provision of article 895(A)(7)
permit the judge to order restitution to victims of a defendant's criminal
acts for non-pecuniary "damage" such as mental anguish, apprehension,
and annoyance caused by the offense?
In State v. Alleman,6 the defendant entered guilty pleas to three of
five counts of an indictment charging him with making obscene phone
4. See State v. Trahan, 367 So. 2d 752 (La. 1978); State v. Bosworth, 360 So. 2d
173 (La. 1978); State v. Underwood, 353 So. 2d 1013 (La. 1977).
5. See La. Const. art. V § 5(A).
6. 439 So. 2d 418 (La. 1983).
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calls. As a condition of probation, the judge ordered the defendant to
pay $500 in restitution to each of the victims named in the original five
count indictment. On appeal the Louisiana Supreme Court set aside the
five-hundred-dollar payments to the two victims in the counts to which
the defendant did not plead. However, the court rejected the defendant's
contention that the restitution for damages envisioned by article 895
was limited to actual "physical" or "tangible" losses and therefore did
not apply to the "mental anguish, apprehension and annoyance suffered
by defendant's victims. ' 7
The writer shares the concerns expressed by the dissenting members
of the court who disagreed, as Justice Watson so aptly phrased the
issue, with "the concept of awarding civil damages in a criminal pro-
ceeding. ' 8 There must be limits, which the court was obviously not
required to outline, to the "awarding of civil damages" under the rubric
of restitution. The problem with Alleman is that the majority did not
hint that such limits exist. In fact, the court cited civil cases for the
proposition that courts award pecuniary indemnification in tort cases
for mental suffering, when it appears to be "real and serious." 9
The rules of procedure and evidence which govern the assessment
of such damages in civil cases have been refined through the years and
presumably are designed to achieve an accurate result as to amount in
a traditional adversary context. Unfortunately, no such similar mecha-
nism exists in the context of Louisisana's present sentencing procedure.
With deference to the conscientious efforts of the trial court, and
to the supreme court, the writer notes that nowhere in the opinion is
7. Id. at 419.
8. Id. at 420 (Watson, J., dissenting in part).
9. Id. at 419. Citing Meador v. Toyota of Jefferson, Inc., 332 So. 2d 433 (La.
1976), and doctrinal writing, the court said:
[Dlefendant argues that a sentencing judge may not impose the condition of
restitution except for a tangible or physical loss, as opposed to the mental
anguish, apprehension, and annoyance suffered by defendant's victims. But the
sentencing judge is authorized unqualifiedly by statute to require "reparation
or restitution to the aggrieved party for damage or loss caused by his offense,"
and this is an explicit component of his general authority to impose any specific
condition reasonably related to defendant's rehabilitation. La. C. Cr. P. art.
895(A)(7). There is nothing in this language or in our law which would indicate
a legislative intent to limit reparation or restitution to bodily injury or property
damage. In the case of torts, for example, the jurisprudence has no difficulty
in awarding a pecuniary indemnification for mental suffering, when it appears
to be real and serious. Meador v. Toyota of Jefferson Inc., 332 So. 2d 433
(La. 1976); Comment, Damages Ex Contractu, 48 Tul. L. Rev. 1160, 1170
(1974); 2 M. Planiol, Traite Elementaire de Droit Civil, no. 252 at 152 (lth
ed. 1959). Moreover, there is no reason to believe that restitution for such
harms is any less reasonably related to rehabilitation than reparation for bodily
injury or damage to property.
439 So. 2d at 419-20.
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there any hint of the method used by the trial judge to arrive at the
five hundred dollar figure. Was this simply an "educated guess" at the
dollar figure which ought to be awarded or was this figure arrived at
by examining similar awards in civil suits? Did experts (psychologists,
counselors, etc.) testify at a sentencing hearing or even voice their views
to a probation officer conducting a presentence report? There is no
information regarding the method used by the trial judge or any sug-
gestion as to approved methods of arriving at such "damage awards"
in future cases.
The writer is also concerned that the majority's approach may have
the effect of approving an award of "punitive damages" to a victim
of crime without carefully considering all of the ramifications of such
a decision. As noted earlier, no clear guidelines were given regarding
the method of fixing such damages for "anguish, apprehension, and
annoyance" suffered by the victim of a crime. Almost all victims of
crime suffer some "mental distress" from being exposed to the criminal
misbehavior of others.
Surely criminal offenders deserve the punishment which is inflicted
upon them by society. The basic question here is a very fundamental
one. What form should that punishment take? The legislature has ap-
proved the imposition of various sanctions, such as imprisonment, other
limitations on freedom in the form of conditions of probation, fines
payable to the state, and even death (in most aggravated homicide cases).
The legislature has not approved what is in effect the payment of a
"fine" to the victim.
Perhaps such sentences more aptly reflect an enlightened theory of
punishment in which the criminal offender is forced to realize that his
misbehavior has directly harmed another human being. The point is
simply that the supreme court should carefully consider and promulgate
guidelines for trial courts. In Allemand, the court only approved of
"restitution" for "mental anguish" and "annoyance" caused by re-
ceiving obscene phone calls. Nevertheless, the obvious difficulty of dis-
covering what dollar amount represents "restitution" as opposed to
"punitive damages" or a fine payable to the victim will no doubt become
apparent in future cases.
APPELLATE REVIEW OF SENTENCE
Remand for Resentencing Before a Different Judge
In a footnote in State v. Telsee,'0 Justice Lemmon suggested, while
dissenting in the reversal of the sentence, that the appellate court should
consider remanding for resentencing before another judge rather than
sending the case back to the same judge after that judge had already
10. 425 So. 2d 1251, 1261 n.1 (La. 1983).
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thrice sentenced the same defendant. In the first appeal in Telsee," the
court remanded for a sentence hearing. A subsequent appeal occasioned
a remand for compliance with Louisiana Code of Criminal Procedure
article 894.1.12 After a hearing, the same sentence was reimposed. In
the third appeal the issue was simply whether the sentence imposed was
excessive in light of the nature of the offense and the characteristics of
the defendant. No improper factors were considered and the sentencing
guideline statute was followed. The court ordered the sentence reduced
and set a maximum term which could be imposed but not exceeded on
sentence. 1"
In such a case, the trial judge has already made a diligent effort
to impose a fair sentence. If the court of appeal disagrees with his or
her assessment, then it may be unfair to require the judge to impose
a sentence with which the judge cannot agree. Therefore, the appellate
court should consider reimposing sentence or referring the case to another
judge, rather than simply giving the trial court limits within which to
sentence.
In State v. Soco, 14 the Louisiana Supreme Court reversed a ninety-
nine year sentence imposed on a first offender for a typical on-the-
street armed robbery. Although the defendant had pushed the victim
around during the robbery and perjured himself during the trial, the
maximum sentence was certainly not appropriate. However, rather than
remanding with upper and lower limits on the length of sentence as has
been done in some cases, the court simply sent the case back to a
different judge.
Adopting such a procedure is an effective use of the supervisory
powers of an appellate court in a case in which the record plainly
denotes a basic difference of opinion between the trial judge and the
appellate panel regarding the severity of the sentence which ought to
be imposed.
Review for Excessiveness After Revocation of Probation
Defendants who agree to plead guilty in return for a suspended
sentence may not be concerned with the term of imprisonment they will
be required to serve if probation is revoked. For that matter, the appellate
court may not be prepared at the initial imposition of the suspended
sentence of imprisonment to determine whether it will be "excessive"
if probation is subsequently revoked.
In State v. Gordon,5 the defendant pled guilty to two counts of
distributing cocaine to police undercover officers and to one count of
11. 388 So. 2d 747 (La. 1980).
12. 404 So. 2d 921 (La. 1981).
13. 425 So. 2d 1251 (La. 1983).
14. 441 So. 2d 719 (La. 1983).
15. 444 So. 2d 1188 (La. 1984).
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conspiracy to distribute cocaine. The dollar amounts involved in the
two sales were $7,200 and $2,400. Defendant's co-conspirator, a man
named Shade, was sentenced to five years at hard labor. However, the
twenty-nine year old defendant had a good educational background and
had previously been employed as a respiratory therapist at a hospital.
He had no prior criminal convictions and led a '"'law abiding" life prior
to his involvement with cocaine. He had lost his job as a result of
missing work and sold cocaine to provide a source of income to continue
his drug abuse.
When the plea agreement was reached, the defendant was aware
that he would receive a twenty year sentence which was to be suspended
with supervised probation for five years conditioned on the defendant's
serving a year in jail and successfully completing a drug treatment
program. Within less than a month of his completion of the drug
program, "THC" (the active ingredient of marijuana) was discovered
in the defendant's urine. He was discharged from the program and a
probation revocation hearing was held. After the revocation hearing,
the trial judge revoked the defendant's probation and ordered him to
serve the twenty year sentence. The defendant was given credit for the
one year already served in jail as a condition of probation.
Defendant appealed his sentence as excessive. The supreme court
distinguished earlier cases16 in which the court had refused to consider
an excessiveness claim because the defendant's sentence was part of a
plea bargain to which the defendant had agreed. The court reasoned
that the length of the suspended sentence was an "insignificant" and
"non-negotiated term of the plea bargain" because "an opportunity for
rehabilitation was being offered as a way to avoid imprisonment.' 17
The court agreed that the twenty year sentence was excessive for a first
offender and remanded for resentencing. With deference, the writer
cannot agree with the court's logic. Although the result may not be
unfair, it would appear that the defendant did agree at the time of his
plea to accept the twenty-year sentence should he willfully fail to comply
with the terms of his probation. Use of marijuana while in the drug
rehabilitation program is clearly a violation of those terms. However,
the supreme court was obviously concerned with the twenty year sentence
for a first offender, even one who was given a fair opportunity to avoid
serving the sentence by complying with the terms of his probation. The
message of Gordon is that a defendant can raise an "excessiveness"
claim after the revocation of probation even though the length of the
term of imprisonment (which was initially suspended) was part of a plea
agreement. '
16. See State v. Curry, 400 So. 2d 614 (La. 1981).
17. 444 So. 2d at 1191.
18. On remand, defendant was sentenced to serve twelve years imprisonment at hard
labor. State v. Gordon, No 111, 723, minutes of sec. 3 (1st La. Jud. Dist. Ct. Aug. 14,
1984). That sentence is presently on appeal.
[Vol. 45
DEVELOPMENTS IN THE LA W, 1983-84
Amendment of Illegal Sentences by Courts of Appeal
When the courts of appeal began to review criminal appeals, they
were confronted with the dilemma of what action to take if the court
"noticed" on its own, without the issue being raised by either party, that the
sentence of the trial court was illegal. A sentence which does not conform
to the maximum or minimum terms set forth in the statute is clearly
error "discoverable by a mere inspection of the pleadings and proceedings
and without inspection of the evidence."' 9 Thus, under the Code of
Criminal Procedure the appellate court can consider the matter although
it is not raised by either party. In a case in which such a review for
"patent error," or "error patent on the face of the record," discloses
a sentence which, although not noticed and objected to by the defendant,
exceeds the statutory limits, then the court of appeal must remand to
the trial court to correct the illegal sentence.
However, with the advent of a large number of mandatory sentences
being enacted, inevitably cases arose in which the trial court, without
objection by the state, sentenced the defendants to illegally lenient terms
not within the statutory limits on the trial court's discretion.
There are several possible explanations for such illegally lenient
sentences. One explanation is that the judge was simply unaware that
the mandatory sentence provision existed. Another related explanation
is that the judge erred in construing such mandatory provisions. A
further explanation might be that the judge chose, possibly at the prompt-
ing of the parties in connection with a "plea bargain," to ignore the
mandatory sentencing provisions. 20 Yet another explanation might be
that the judge declined to impose a mandatory sentence feature such
as the "without benefit of parole" provision limiting parole eligibility
because he or she did not consider it to be a limit on the trial court's
discretion, but rather one on the parole board's discretion to grant
parole. A final possibility might be a trial judge's wish to discourage
appeals because the "patent error" would be discovered and, if the
conviction was not reversed and the mandatory feature was invoked by
the court of appeal, the defendant would be in a worse position after
the appeal than he was beforehand.
'There are several possible approaches which appellate courts could
take when confronted with such "patent error" favorable to the de-
fendant. One approach would be to ignore the error if not raised by
the state in the trial court. Another would be to remand to the trial
court with instructions to reimpose sentence in conformity with the
statutory mandate. Still another would be to correct the error on appeal
by raising the term of imprisonment to the minimum, or adding the
limitation "without benefit of parole," or requiring that the defendant
19. La. Code Crim. P. art. 920.
20. See State v. Coleman, 451 So, 2d 185, 189 n.2 (La. App. 1st Cir. 1984).
19841
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serve the sentence which was illegally suspended, or by imposing a fine
as well as imprisonment if both are required by the statute.
The defect of this last alternative is obvious. The court of appeal
is, in effect, exercising the sentencing discretion which the trial court
was supposed to exercise. If the trial court was unaware of or chose
to ignore the mandatory provisions and is ordered to comply, the length
of the sentence or the amount of the fine might vary. For example, if
the defendant is convicted of armed robbery and the sentence is imposed
without the limitation on parole eligibility ("without benefit of parole"),
simply adding that restriction on appeal, rather than remanding to the
trial court to resentence, drastically alters the sentence without giving
the sentencing judge the option to reduce the length of the term in view
of the defendant's lack of parole eligibility. Thus, the option of re-
manding is a better choice than simply endeavoring to "correct" the
sentence. The "correction" may impose a more severe sentence than
the trial court either intended to impose or was required to impose.
The courts of appeal in Louisiana were divided as to the proper
approach,2 and the stage was obviously set for the supreme court to
render a definitive decision. An earlier writ application had been granted
in State v. Napoli,2 2 setting aside the court of appeal's decision and
reinstating the original sentence of the trial court. In briefly explaining
the per curiam order in Napoli, the supreme court said:
When the defendant alone seeks review of a conviction and
sentence, the court of appeal should review only those issues
raised by the defendant and any patent errors favorable to
defendant. The court of appeal erred in this case by reviewing
a sentencing error unfavorable to defendant, thereby providing
a chilling effect on defendant's exercise of his right to appeal. 23
However, the first circuit court of appeal in State v. Jackson,24
in a scholarly and thought-provoking opinion by Judge Shortess, declined
to follow the writ grant in Napoli because the supreme court in State
v. Telsee25 had itself noted on appeal that the defendant's sentence was
"illegally lenient" in that the trial court's sentence in a forcible rape
case failed to specify that the first two years of the forty (reduced to
21. See, e.g., State v. Gatlin, 445 So. 2d 47 (La. App. 4th Cir. 1984); State v. Jones,
445 So. 2d 26 (La. App. 4th Cir. 1984); State v. Wright, 446 So. 2d 479 (La. App. 4th
Cir. 1984); State v. Ogletree, 446 So. 2d 415 (La. App. 4th Cir. 1984); State v. Tate,
444 So. 2d 753 (La. App. 4th Cir. 1984); State v. Lee, 445 So. 2d 54 (La. App. 4th
Cir. 1984); State v. Thomas, 439 So. 2d 629 (La. App. 1st Cir. 1983), rev'd on other
grounds, 452 So. 2d 1177 (La. 1984); State v. Jimmerson, 432 So. 2d 1093 (La. App.
3d Cir. 1983).
22. 437 So. 2d 868 (La. 1983).
23. Id. at 868 (citation omitted).
24. 439 So. 2d 622 (La. App. 1st Cir. 1983), rev'd, 452 So. 2d 682 (La. 1984).
25. 425 So. 2d 1251 (La. 1983).
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twenty-five) year sentence be served without benefit of parole. Judge
Shortess pointed out in Jackson that courts of appeal had in effect
received mixed signals from the supreme court on this issue and opted
to follow the "fully considered opinion" in Telsee because Napoli was
"only a writ action."
The response to Jackson by the supreme court was very clear. The
supreme court granted writs and unanimously reversed, holding that the
courts of appeal should "ignore the error, unless the prosecution, having
properly raised the issue in the trial court, has sought appellate review." 26
The decision is clearly based on the Louisiana constitutional right of a
defendant to seek review of a conviction.2 7 The court expressed the view
that permitting "[sluch modifications . . may produce a 'chilling effect'
on the exercise of the right to appeal." '28
The basis for the supreme court's decision in Jackson will clearly
be of great significance. By Act 587 of 1984, article 882 of the Code
of Criminal Procedure was amended expressly to provide that an "illegal
sentence may be corrected . . by an appellate court on review." The
amendment was sponsored by the Louisiana District Attorney's Asso-
ciation and was proposed prior to the supreme court's decision in Jackson.
Nevertheless, since Jackson was not based on statutory construction, but
rather on the Louisiana constitutional right to seek review, the statute
should have no effect.
The writer recognizes the obvious possibility that trial courts under
Jackson in effect have a "free rein" to ignore mandatory sentencing
provisions as long as the district attorney fails to raise a proper ob-
jection.2 9 This, of course, raises the possibility that the prosecution and
defense counsel can agree, if the trial court will approve, to a sentence
of less than the mandatory minimum as part of a "plea bargain."
Such ignoring of the legislature's mandatory terms does not offend
the writer and appears arguably to fall within the spirit of the Louisiana
prosecutor's broad prerogative to decide whether to invoke the provisions
26. State v. Jackson, 452 So. 2d 682, 684 (La. 1984).
27. La. Const. art. I, § 19; id. art. V, § 10.
28. 452 So. 2d at 683 (citations omitted).
29. In State v. Coleman, 451 So. 2d 185, 189 n.2 (La. App. 1st Cir. 1984), Judge
Crain, author of Coleman and a member of the court of appeal panel in Jackson, said:
If the appellate courts are restricted from correcting or ordering corrected a
sentence illegal in favor of a defendant, and the parole board is required to
honor an illegal sentence, serious problems are going to be presented even with
the ability of the trial court to correct the sentence. It would become impossible
for an illegal sentence to be corrected in the event it is acquiesed in by the
State. Thus, a defendant charged with armed robbery could be sentenced, and
the sentence suspended, or be given with parole and probation and absent a
State motion to correct the sentence, it would stand. Consequently, mandatory
sentencing requirements could be ignored if the State desired. Given the desire
in so many instances to obtain a guilty plea, this result is not at all improbable.
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of a particular legislative sanction. 0 If these "mandatory sentences" are
seen as penalties which society can insist upon the trial court's imposing,
then the prosecutor's decision not to insist on their invocation is anal-
ogous to his decision in the charging process not to use the legislative
enactment which has the mandatory penalty. Put simply, if the prosecutor
has the constitutional authority not to charge the crime which carries
the mandatory penalty, arguably he should not have to insist on invoking
those mandatory penalties even though he has chosen to prosecute for
the offense. The counter argument is that his charging decision auto-
matically invokes the mandatory penalty and that the only constitutional
prerogative is to refuse to charge that particular offense. Nevertheless,
it is the duty of the prosecutor (not the court of appeals) to decide
whether to invoke the state's right to have a severe mandatory sentence
imposed. Jackson fits well into the Louisiana scheme of prosecutorial
discretion.
Amendment of Excessive Sentences
Most often appellate courts merely remand to the trial court if a
sentence is found to be excessive. Sometimes, as in State v. Sepulvado,3'
the original case recognizing the Louisiana constitutional duty to review
for excessiveness, the appellate court will outline the limits of an ac-
ceptable sentence. In some cases, such as State v. Telsee,a2 the supreme
court simply has amended and reduced a sentence at the appellate level
after once unsuccessfully remanding for compliance with Code of Crim-
inal Procedure article 894.1 with a gentle suggestion to the trial court
that the sentence imposed may be excessive.
As noted earlier in this article, the writer agrees with the approach
taken by Chief Justice Dixon in Soco of simply remanding for resent-
encing before another judge if the appellate court and the trial court
have totally divergent views of the severity of a particular case. However,
some courts of appeal have followed the lead of Telsee and, after giving
the trial court a chance to reduce the sentence, amend the sentence to
conform to the appellate court's view of an appropriate disposition.
For example, in State v. Martz,33 the trial court initially sentenced
the defendant to five years imprisonment at hard labor for selling
marijuana to an undercover officer. On the defendant's first appeal,
the appellate court remanded for compliance with Code of Criminal
Procedure article 894.1, suggesting that the trial judge failed to "accord
proper weight" to the guidelines.3 4 After a resentencing hearing the judge
30. La. Const. art. V, § 26(B).
31, 367 So. 2d 762 (La. 1979).
32. 425 So. 2d 1251 (La. 1983).
33. 454 So. 2d 278 (La. App. 4th Cir. 1984).
34. State v. Martz, 436 So. 2d 712, 714 (La. App. 4th Cir. 1983).
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imposed the same five year sentence with extensive oral reasons for his
sentence. The trial judge placed great emphasis on the seriousness of
distribution and on the defendant's assaulting the arresting officer. On
the defendant's second appeal, the court of appeal noted its earlier
reference to defendant's good employment record and lack of any prior
criminal history. It also noted that the defendant's "'rural background
and inexperience' prevented him from contemplating that his conduct,
which involved the sale of only two matchboxes of marijuana, would
"'cause or threaten serious harm."' 3 Accordingly, the appellate court
reduced the sentence from five years to two years imprisonment at hard
labor.
In another case, State v. Johnson,3 6 the sixty-three-year-old defendant
was sentenced to five years at hard labor for negligent homicide of a
two year old child resulting from a vehicular wreck in which the de-
fendant was drunk and driving 45 mph in a 20 mph school zone. The
court of appeal found that the sentence was excessive and amended the
five year sentence only by deleting the requirement that it be served at
hard labor.
These cases are only isolated examples. However, they highlight the
willingness of some appellate panels, in effect, to substitute their judg-
ment for that of a trial judge. Obviously, any appellate finding that a
trial court's sentence was excessive must involve an appellate court
judgment that the trial court's judgment was too severe. However, the
question is not simply: "would the appellate judge have imposed a
similarly harsh sentence?" The margin of discretion accorded to the trial
court, in effect the margin of "tolerable error," is really the issue. No
doubt, appellate judges must have difficulty in gauging the degree of
deference which they must accord to a trial judge who has imposed
what they perceive to be an unduly harsh sentence.
MANDATORY FIREARM SENTENCING STATUTE
Applications
In 1981, the legislature adopted a very strict limitation on the trial
court's sentencing discretion in felony cases in which a firearm was
used. Article 893.1 of the Code of Criminal Procedure requires the
judge to impose the maximum sentence if that sentence is less than five
years and to impose a minimum five year sentence if the maximum
exceeds five years.17 Further, parole eligibility and suspension of sentence
are denied.
35. 454 So. 2d at 281 (quoting from an earlier appeal in the same case).
36. 444 So. 2d 750 (La. App. 4th Cir. 1984).
37. The provisions of Code of Criminal Procedure articlq 893.1 do not apply in cases
1984l
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The mandatory provisions of the article only apply if the court
makes a "finding" that a firearm was used in the commission of the
felony. However, courts of appeal have not required a separate adversary
hearing or any further pleading by the prosecution. Further, some cases
suggest that the court on its own motion must determine whether a
firearm was used and must impose the mandatory sentence accordingly.38
This writer expressed his concern with the concept of imposing such
limits on the trial court's sentencing discretion and with the technical
deficiencies in the statute in an earlier volume of this review.3 9 There
was then relatively little jurisprudence on the new statute. This is un-
derstandable both because the process of appeals requires time and
because some trial judges apparently have not been complying-with the
statute's mandate. However, during the last term a number of appellate
decisions addressing a number of issues have been handed down.
In State v. Moore,40 the police were called to attend to a domestic
dispute. The result was a violent encounter between the defendant and
police during which shots were fired. Fortunately, no one was injured.
The defendant eventually entered a guilty plea to one count of attempted
first degree murder. During his Boykin examination, he acknowledged
that he fired at the officers and was informed before sentence that the
mandatory provisions of article 893.1 would apply. Without holding any
further hearings on the "use of a firearm," the trial court imposed an
eight year sentence of imprisonment at hard labor without benefit of
parole.
The court of appeal rejected the defendant's contention that he was
entitled to an adversary hearing to determine whether a firearm was
used. The court of appeal noted that the defendant had acknowledged
the use of a firearm during the Boykin examination and referred to the
"extensive sources of information" upon which a sentencing court tra-
ditionally may draw.
With deference, the writer feels that the court of appeal should not
have equated the "finding" required by Code of Criminal Procedure
article 893.1 with other information used by trial courts in sentencing
for the simple reason that the term "finding" normally connotes a
judicial determination of fact following an adversary hearing. Further-
more, such a "finding" is of critical significance because it calls forth
the dramatically severe effects of the statute. On that basis alone, the
court of appeal should have required the trial court to afford the
of offenses with penalty provisions which deny probation eligibility. See, e.g., La. R.S.
14:64 (1974).
38. See infra notes 40-47 and accompanying text.
39. Joseph, Developments in the Law 1980-1981-Postconviction Procedure, 42 La.
L. Rev. 701 (1981).
40. 442 So. 2d 726 (La. App. 1st Cir. 1983).
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defendant an adversary hearing on the issues. That is not to say that
the trial judge improperly considered the defendant's Boykin admission
or that a trial judge commits error in considering the trial record (if
there is a trial). Nevertheless, the interest in having a reliable fact-finding
procedure leading to a trial court's finding of "use of a firearm" is
great in these cases and judges should allow defendants an adversary
proceeding before deciding that they are bound by the mandatory,
discretion-limiting provisions of article 893.1. However, the writer con-
cedes that the fault lies with the legislature for not providing more
detailed guidance regarding the procedure to be followed in making the
crucial "finding." The matter addresses itself to an amendment of the
statute.
In Moore, the court of appeal also .rejected the defendant's con-
tention that he was entitled to be charged formally under article 893.1
before being sentenced under that statute. Relying on the supreme court's
rejection in State v. Roussel4l of a similar argument in connection with
a similar sentencing provision in Louisiana Revised Statutes 14:95.2, the
court of appeal held that "[u]sing a firearm . . . is not a separate
crime and there is no necessity for a separate charge." '42
The writer certainly agrees that the analogy to article 95.2 of the
Criminal Code is appropriate and that the sentencing provision does not
define a separate offense. Nevertheless, the legislature should have re-
quired a presentence motion by the prosecutor, or even by the court
itself, which would serve to give notice to the defendant of the intent
to invoke the statute. The elements of the crime frequently do not
require proof of the use of a firearm. In such cases, the motion would
serve as the only formal allegation that a firearm was involved. Even
in the absence of an explicit legislative requirement, the courts still have
the inherent authority to adopt such a procedure under article 3 of the
Code of Criminal Procedure. Requiring such notice would certainly
enhance the fairness of sentencing and would, in that sense, conform
to the "spirit" of the code.
In State v. McKnight,43 the defendant was convicted of manslaughter
for the shooting death of his estranged wife. In sentencing the defendant,
the trial judge determined that a firearm was used and imposed a penalty
of eighteen years imprisonment at hard labor without benefit of parole.
The length of the sentence was within the twenty-one year statutory
limit and was not unusual for manslaughter cases. However, the ap-
plication of the firearm sentencing statute significantly increased the
severity of the imprisonment by denying parole eligibility-a restriction
41. 424 So. 2d 226 (La. 1982).
42. 442 So. 2d at 728.
43. 446 So. 2d 915 (La. App. 1st Cir. 1984).
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not imposed in the penalty provision for manslaughter. With the firearm
statute, a more serious sanction applies to manslaughter committed by
shooting the victim as opposed to stabbing or other violent, and possibly
more heinous, means of unlawful killing.
The court of appeal rejected the defendant's argument that the
statute's restriction on parole eligibility only applied to five years of
the eighteen year sentence. Although the minimum sentence is five years,
whatever sentence the trial court imposes must be served without benefit
of parole. The language of the statute clearly mandates such a result.
The court of appeal's construction of the statute simply indicates
another of the statute's dramatically severe results. All sentences for
felonies committed with firearms must be served without benefit of
parole. The trial judge is not given the option to determine whether
the portion of the sentence in excess of the five year minimum should
be without benefit of parole.
In State v. Jackson,44 the defendant was convicted of manslaughter
and the trial court invoked the mandatory sentence provisions of both
Code of Criminal Procedure article 893.1 and Revised Statutes 14:95.2.
The defendant was sentenced to fifteen years imprisonment without
benefit of parole under article 893.1 and then was sentenced to an
additional two years without benefit of parole under Revised Statutes
14:95.2. The court of appeal rejected a defense theory that the subsequent
enactment of the Code of Criminal Procedure article impliedly repealed
Revised Statutes 14:95.2.
What is more significant is the court's conclusion that the legislature
intended to permit (and to require) the sentencing court to apply the
two statutes in tandem. As the court of appeal pointed out, article 893.1
applies to all felonies committed with a firearm but does not add to
the statutory maximum sentence. Article 893.1 serves simply to limit
discretion by imposing a minimum term of imprisonment and by denying
probation or parole. On the other hand Revised Statutes 14:95.2 provides
for an additional term of imprisonment and only applies to convictions
for certain enumerated crimes. Because both statutes are phrased in
mandatory terms, not only may the trial court use both, but the logical
implication of Jackson is that the legislature mandates the use of both
statutes.
In State v. Victorian,4 the court of appeal, on rehearing, held that
the mandatory sentencing provisions of Code of Criminal Procedure
article 893.1 apply to the felony of illegal use of weapons defined in
Revised Statutes 14:94.
Judge Knoll expressed the view on original hearing, and in dissent
on rehearing, that the legislature established a specific penalty for the
44. 454 So. 2d 211 (La. App. 1st Cir. 1984).
45. 448 So. 2d 1304 (La. App. 3d Cir.), cert. denied, 452 So. 2d 167 (La. 1984).
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illegal use of a firearm in enacting Revised Statutes 14:94 and provided
for enhanced penalties only in the event of subsequent convictions. Judge
Knoll reasoned as follows:
Article 893.1 is an enhanced penalty to be applied to general
statutes that do not require the element of a weapon or firearm,
e.g., manslaughter, negligent homicie, murder, and etc. But in
specific statutes e.g., illegal use of a weapon, any "aggravated"
offenses when a firearm is used, armed robbery, and etc., Article
893.1 is not to be applied because absent an express legislative
intent, it is assumed that the legislature, in fixing penalties for
specific offenses committed with a firearm, intended the penalty
to take this into account.4 6
Judge Yelverton, writing in dissent on original hearing, and for
the court on rehearing, pointed to the anomaly of a legislative scheme
mandating severe maximum penalties for felonies not requiring the use
of firearms or other weapons, but frequently involving such instruments,
and not imposing a similar mandate for crimes which specifically require
the involvement of such dangerous weapons. Judge Yelverton was con-
vinced that the "[Ilegislature's manifest attitude regarding the use of
firearms in the commission of felonies ' 47 was to impose the severe
sanctions outlined in article 893.1.
The writer believes that Judge Yelverton correctly assessed the leg-
islative intent. Article 893.1 is a sweeping limitation on traditional pre-
rogatives of trial judges and is obviously designed to require more severe
sentences than are otherwise required if a firearm is used.
Amendment of Sentences By Trial Courts
As noted in the previous section, the supreme court in Jackson
clearly prohibited appellate courts from correcting illegally lenient sen-
tences on their own motion. About one month prior to the supreme
court's decision in Jackson, in State v. Coleman48 the same panel of
the first circuit court of appeal that initially decided Jackson was con-
fronted with an attempted manslaughter case in which the state moved
to have the trial court invoke the mandatory sentencing provisions of
both Code of Criminal Procedure article 893.1 and Louisiana Revised
Statutes 14:95.2 after the conviction and initial sentence had already
been affirmed on appeal.
The trial court's original five-year sentence of imprisonment at hard
labor did not specify that the sentence must be served without benefit
of parole. The state also asked that an "additional" two year sentence,
46. Id. at 1307.
47. Id. at 1309.
48. 451 So. 2d 185 (La. App. 1st Cir. 1984).
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without benefit of parole be imposed under Revised Statutes 14:95.2
because attempted manslaughter while using a firearm is one of the
crimes enumerated in that statute. In its motion, the prosecution pointed
out that the evidence in the trial record clearly established that the
offense was committed with a firearm. The trial judge agreed and ruled
that he was compelled to resentence the defendant to five years im-
prisonment at hard labor without benefit of parole and was required
to add two years without benefit of parole. The court of appeal agreed
with the trial court's conclusions that the initial sentence was illegal and
that both Code of Criminal Procedure article 893.1 and Revised Statutes
14:95.2 must be invoked if both statutes fit the circumstances, i.e., the
offense is a felony enumerated in the Revised Statutes and was committed
with a firearm. The court of appeal rejected defendant's contention that
the mandatory "double enhancement" resulting from the use of both
statutes was neither intended nor acceptable under the statutory scheme.
Coleman is a very important case and, if not reversed by the supreme
court on writs, clearly demonstrates the unreasonably harsh effect of
the two mandatory firearm sentence statutes . 49 Coleman holds that the
state may invoke the mandatory sanctions after the defendant has already
begun to serve his sentence. Furthermore, Coleman clearly says that the
trial court must amend if the record supports a finding that a firearm
was used. To do otherwise, the opinion clearly implies, would be to
impose an illegal sentence. Finally, and most obviously the harshest
result, the trial court must impose a "five plus two" sentence without
parole to satisfy both mandatory statutes. The court of appeal found
a legislative intent not simply to permit but to require the application
of both statutes. 50
A partial solution to the problem is 'to treat the requirement of a
"finding" by the trial court as requiring an adversary hearing provoked
by the court on its own motion or on motion of the prosecutor before
sentencing. If a formal adversary finding was not made prior to the
imposition of the initial sentence, then the original sentence was not
illegal, and hence, could not subsequently be amended.
49. Writs have been granted and at the time of this writing the matter is pending.
50. See State v. Hogan, 454 So. 2d 1235 (La. App. 2d Cir. 1984). See also State
v. Williams, 454 So. 2d 1287 (La. App. 2d Cir. 1984), in which the court of appeal
discusses the unfairness of a sentence under Code of Criminal Procedure article 893.1
when applied to an entirely accidental (but criminally negligent) killing with a firearm.
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